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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, fire and evacuation computer simulations are used to reconstruct the 1985 
Manchester Airport B737 fire that resulted in the loss of 55 lives. First the actual fire and 
evacuation are reconstructed. Secondly, the impact of exit opening times and external wind 
on the fire and evacuation are investigated. Finally, the potential benefit offered by modern 
materials is evaluated.  The results suggest that the number of fatalities could have been 
reduced by 87% had the forward right exit not malfunctioned and by 36% had the right over-
wing exit been opened without delay. Furthermore, given the fuel pool size and location, a 
critical wind speed of 1.5 m/s is necessary to cause the fire plume to lean onto the fuselage 
eventually resulting in fuselage burn-through. Finally, it is suggested that the use of modern 
cabin materials could have made a significant difference to the fire development and 
survivability. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
CFD 
EU FP7 
FAA 
Computational Fluid Dynamics 
European Union Framework Programme 7 
Federal Aviation Administration 
FED Fractional Effective Dose 
FIC Fractional Irritant Concentration 
FIH Fractional Incapacitating dose of Heat 
FIN Fractional Incapacitating dose of Narcotic agents 
HRR Heat Release Rate (kW) 
ROW 
TSB 
Right Over Wing 
Transportation Safety Board 
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
On the 22nd of August 1985, a B737-236 suffered an uncontained engine failure and fire 
during its take-off roll at Manchester Airport, England(1).  During the accident, the external 
fuel fire entered the cabin after burn-through of the fuselage via vent grills, cabin walls and 
window seals assisted by a relatively mild wind. During the fire incident, two of the four 
cabin crew and 53 of the 131 passengers died and a further 15 passengers were severely 
injured by the effects of the fire and toxic gases.  The forward left (Exit L1), forward right 
(Exit R1) and right over-wing (Exit ROW) exits were utilised during the evacuation. From 
the official accident investigation report, it is suggested that the delay in opening the exit 
doors was one of the key factors contributing to the high loss of life in this accident, but how 
significant this contribution was could not be evaluated. It is also suggested that the right rear 
exit (Exit R2), opened but not used  for  evacuation, may have contributed to the high loss of 
life by allowing smoke to enter the cabin. Again, how significant this event was to 
contributing to the number of fatalities could not be assessed.  As this fire occurred some 30 
years ago, it is also of interest to determine whether improvements in passive fire protection 
achieved through the development of modern cabin materials since 1985 could have made a 
significant difference to passenger survivability in this type of accident.  
 
This is an important issue as unfortunately, aircraft fires of this type are not rare. Almost 30 
years to the day after the Manchester B737 accident, a B777 aircraft caught fire at Las Vegas 
airport, USA(2).  As in the 1985 accident, the B777 fire, which occurred on the 9th September 
2015, also started from a failed engine and occurred during the take-off phase. In this incident 
wind also appears to be blowing the fire plume onto the fuselage and fuselage burn-through 
occurs.  Fortunately however, all 170 people on-board successfully evacuated in this accident. 
Thus, while this study focuses on the events of 1985, the findings still have important 
application to modern day fire safety and the current generation of commercial aircraft.   
 
Since the start of commercial aviation, fire and emergency evacuation have been concerns 
shared by operators, regulators and the travelling public(3). The industry has worked hard to 
reduce the likelihood of fire, and in the event of fire to reduce the speed of its spread and to 
ensure that passengers threatened by fire can rapidly and safely evacuate. Most of this 
development has been supported by full-scale experimental studies to understand the 
development of aircraft cabin fires and assess passenger survivability(4). However, full-scale 
fire tests are time consuming and financially costly.  Thus the number of fire scenarios that 
can be practically examined is limited. As a result studying the impact of a realistic external 
wind on aircraft fire, as occurred in the 1985 B737 and the 2015 B777 fires, through full-
scale fire tests is impractical.   This type of analysis must rely on computer simulation.    
 
Fire field modelling using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) has been underway for a 
number of years and is capable of simulating aircraft cabin fires(5, 6). Due to the lack of 
sophistication of early fire models and limitations of computer capability, early modelling 
applications(6-10) usually treated the fire as a volumetric source of heat or fuel and simulations 
were generally intended to represent non-spreading fires. In a recent application of fire field 
modelling to aircraft fire, Jia et al(11, 12) used the SMARTFIRE CFD fire simulation tool to 
assist the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada, Fire and Explosion Group, in their 
investigation of the Swissair MD-11 in-flight fire which resulted in the loss of the aircraft and 
all passengers and crew.  The fire spread model developed by Jia et al was capable of 
modelling flame spread over combustible interior solid surfaces of the aircraft. This fire 
spread model has been further validated by simulating one of the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) post-crash cabin fire experiments(13), a full scale mock-up of Station 
Nightclub fire(14) and a rail car fire test(15). This model has also been used to investigate post-
crash cabin fires of a blended wing body aircraft with around 1000 passengers and crew(16). 
 
Aircraft evacuation is typically evaluated through full-scale evacuation trials conducted using 
real people and actual aircraft. The aircraft evacuation certification protocol(17) is designed 
around the threat of a post crash fire and the resulting onset of non-survivable conditions 
which may develop within the passenger cabin. The certification trial assumes 50% exit 
availability, with one exit from each pair being used. The trial imposes the performance 
requirement that the last person must safely evacuate from the aircraft within 90 seconds.  In 
order to limit the likelihood of injury to the test subjects, the nature of the evacuation 
scenarios investigated is limited.  Furthermore, due to high costs associated with undertaking 
such trials, the number of evacuation trials that are undertaken is also limited.  Computer 
simulation of aircraft evacuation offers a means of circumventing the identified limitations 
associated with full scale evacuation trials and has been underway since the early 1990s(18, 19).  
An early review of aircraft evacuation models(20) identified four models that could potentially 
be used for evacuation certification; of which airEXODUS(16, 18, 19, 21-23) is the only model still 
in common use and development.  More recently, other agent based aircraft evacuation 
models similar to airEXODUS have been developed(24-30).  However of these, airEXODUS is 
the most validated aircraft evacuation model (see for example(23) where the software was 
validated using data from 90 second certification trials for four wide-body and two narrow-
body aircraft) currently available.  Furthermore, it is the only aircraft evacuation model that 
can be easily coupled with CFD fire simulation software to investigate the impact a 
developing fire can have on passenger survivability and evacuation(31).  
  
In this study, the Manchester airport B737 fire is investigated using coupled fire and 
evacuation computer simulation. In an earlier numerical study of this incident the external 
pool fire was simply represented by a rectangle fuel pan adjacent to the burn-through area of 
the fuselage at the cabin floor level(31). This greatly simplified the fire simulation analysis but 
did not adequately represent the fire plume or the impact of wind on the fire plume.  In the 
current study, the external fire under the left aircraft engine is represented using a pool fire 
model recently developed as part of the EU FP7 AircraftFire project(32, 33). The results of the 
fire simulation are then coupled to an evacuation simulation to address the following 
questions:  
 How did the delay in opening the malfunctioning Exit R1 impact passenger 
survivability?   
 How did the delay in opening Exit ROW impact passenger survivability? 
 Did the opening of the unused Exit R2 contribute to the high loss of life?  
 What is the critical wind speed beyond which the fuselage would be at high risk of 
burn-through from the external fuel pool fire? 
 What would be the expected impact on passenger survivability if modern fire 
resistant fuselage insulation materials were used? 
 What would be the expected impact on passenger survivability if modern fire 
resistant cabin interior materials were used? 
   
 
2.0 COMPUTATIONAL FIRE AND EVACUATION SIMULATION TOOLS 
 
A research version of the SMARTFIRE V4.1 software is used to perform the fire simulations 
in this study. The SMARTFIRE software has been described in previous publications(11-16, 31, 
34)  and so is not described in detail in this paper. The CFD engine in SMARTFIRE has many 
physics features that are required for fire field modelling, such as the multiple ray radiation 
model, the volumetric heat release model, the gaseous combustion model, smoke model, 
toxicity model, flame spread model, pool fire model and k-epsilon turbulence model.  The 
flame propagation model(12), which is used to simulate the ignition of interior solid materials 
in the current analysis, plays an important role in successfully simulating the spread of fire 
inside the cabin. This model has been recently refined to minimise the mesh dependence of 
numerical predictions of flame spread over solid burnable surfaces(15). A newly developed 
pool fire model within SMARTFIRE is used to generate gaseous fuel from pool of liquid 
kerosene based on vapour equilibrium at the liquid fuel surface and energy balance at the 
surface(32, 33).  In the fire analysis presented here the following hazards are predicted; 
temperature, smoke concentration (extinction coefficient), radiative flux, CO concentration, 
CO2 concentration and O2 concentration.  Note that the generation of irritant fire gases is not 
included in these simulations. 
 
Because of its extensive validation history and ability to couple with CFD fire simulation, the 
airEXODUS(16, 18, 19, 21-23) evacuation model is used to perform the evacuation simulations 
presented in this paper. airEXODUS is designed for applications in the aviation industry 
including, aircraft design, compliance with 90-second certification requirements, crew 
training, development of crew procedures, resolution of operational issues and accident 
investigation.  The software has been used many times in design applications for aircraft 
manufacturers (e.g. Airbus, Bombardier and Mitsubishi) to de-risk new design concepts (e.g. 
A380, CSeries, MRJ), to demonstrate compliance with evacuation requirements for VIP 
configured aircraft (Jet Aviation), to determine the impact of novel cabin layouts (Zodiac 
Aerospace) and to explore the feasibility of novel aircraft configurations such as Blended 
Wing Body Aircraft(16). 
 
The EXODUS software takes into consideration people-people, people-fire and people-
structure interactions. It comprises five core interacting sub-models: the PASSENGER, 
MOVEMENT, BEHAVIOUR, TOXICITY and HAZARD sub-models. The PASSENGER 
sub-model describes an individual as a collection of defining attributes and variables such as 
name, gender, age, maximum unhindered fast walking speed, maximum unhindered walking 
speed, response time, agility, etc. The HAZARD sub-model controls the atmospheric and 
physical environment by importing the predicted fire hazard data, like those generated by the 
SMARTFIRE CFD fire model.  The TOXICITY sub-model determines the physiological 
effects on an individual exposed to the toxic and thermal environment distributed by the 
HAZARD sub-model.  This is determined using the Fractional Effective Dose (FED) and 
Fractional Irritant Concentration (FIC) concept(35). Within airEXODUS two models are 
provided for the determination of the fractional effective dose of radiative heat, the so-called 
Pain Threshold model (in which the dose required to cause effect (Dr) is 80 s(kW/m
2)4/3, 
which is the equivalent to an exposure of 2.5 kW/m2 for 24 seconds) and the Incapacitation 
model (in which Dr = 1000 s(kW/m
2)4/3, the equivalent to an exposure to 2.6 kW/m2 for 5 
minutes which can result in a 1% mortality)(14).  The Incapacitation model is used in the 
calculations in this study. When a passenger moves through a smoke filled environment their 
travel speed is reduced according to the experimental data of Jin(36) which relates light 
extinction coefficient to walking speed. All these effects are communicated to the 
BEHAVIOUR sub-model which, in turn, feeds through to the movement of the individual. 
The behaviours in airEXODUS include crawling, climbing over seats, maintaining target 
exits, wayfinding, aisle swapping and crew redirection etc. In the coupled fire and evacuation 
analysis presented here the following fire related parameters are considered: 
 Light extinction coefficient – related to walking speed using the Jin data(36) and 
whether the agent is walking or crawling. 
 FIH – fractional incapacitating dose of heat, both radiative and convective (based on 
the Purser model(35)). 
 FIN – fractional incapacitating dose of narcotic agents, which in this simulation 
include CO, CO2 and O2 based on the Purser model
(35)). 
 
An agent is considered incapacitated when the FED (either FIN or FIH) is equal to one.  An 
agent is considered injured if their FED (either or both FIH or FIN) is greater than 0.1.  
 
A technique coupling the fire and evacuation simulation is used in this study. This technique 
was developed by the authors and has been successfully used in a forensic analysis of the 
Rhode Island Station Nightclub fire which resulted in 100 fatalities(14). It has also been used 
as part of a design evaluation of a Blended Wing Body aircraft concept involving 1000 
passengers and crew(16).  
 
3.0 RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FIRE AND EVACUATION 
 
3.1 The accident 
 
The B737-236 involved in the Manchester disaster is shown in Fig. 1. In the accident, the 
prevailing wind caused the fire plume from the left engine and pool fire to lean against the 
aircraft fuselage, resulting in fuselage burn-through via the vent grills, window seals and 
cabin walls generating a severe interior cabin fire. As seen in Fig. 1, the final burn-through 
damage to the cabin wall is estimated to be approximately 2 m wide. The time for the rear 
fuselage and tail to collapse was not established, but is some time after the last passenger had 
evacuated.  Therefore, this collapse is not considered relevant to passenger evacuation and 
survivability in the present reconstruction.  
 
 
Figure 1. Damage to the B737-236 fuselage in the Manchester accident(1). 
 
In total the aircraft had three pairs of exits. From front to rear they were Type-I (a floor level 
exit sufficiently wide to allow one person to pass through at a time) crew operated exits, 
Type-III (small hatch type exit in which the passenger must climb up into the exit and down 
to the wing) passenger operated over wing exits and at the rear, Type-I crew operated exits. 
Of these only the forward left (Exit L1), forward right (Exit R1) and right over-wing (Exit 
ROW) exits were utilised during the evacuation – half the number of available exits. During 
the evacuation the passengers and cabin crew experienced difficulty in opening most of the 
exits. Indeed Exit ROW was opened by passengers approximately 45 seconds after the 
aircraft had stopped.  The front crewmember first attempted to open Exit R1. The exit 
malfunctioned and the crewmember turned to open Exit L1 and then returned to eventually 
open Exit R1. As a result, Exit L1 was opened after approximately 25 seconds and Exit R1 
was eventually opened after 70 seconds. From analysis of full-scale certification trials, the 
front exits should be opened within 8.2 seconds and the over-wing exit should be opened 
within 12 seconds(37).  Although the aft right exit (R2) was opened before the aircraft 
completely stopped, it was not used by passengers due to the presence of heavy smoke in the 
vicinity of the exit.  
 
3.2 Reconstruction methodology 
 
The reconstruction of the accident involves a two-step process, first the fire is simulated and 
then the coupled fire and evacuation is simulated. The results from the fire simulation are part 
of the inputs to the evacuation simulation to predict the impact of the fire on the evacuating 
passengers. The passengers are exposed to the fire hazards determined from the fire 
simulations which include; temperature, radiative flux, concentrations of toxic gases, low 
oxygen and smoke obscuration. In these simulations, some identified contributing factors, F1-
F7 as stated below, taken from the accident investigation report(1) are used as input 
parameters.  
F1: An external wind of 5-7 kts (2.57-3.60 m/s) with an angle of 250o to the north;  
F2: The external pool fire location and area; 
F3: The size and location of the cabin burn-through; 
F4: Fire penetration via floor air-conditioning grills occurred within 20 seconds. 
F5: Availability of exits for evacuation and opening time for each exit;  
F6: Seating locations of the passengers. 
F7: The exit used by each survivor. 
 
However, there are still many uncertain details which have an impact on the fire development 
and the evacuation dynamics. The key parameters that are required as part of the simulation 
setup but cannot be determined from the investigation report include: 
U1: The rate of smoke entry via the air-conditioning grills before the burn-through of 
the side cabin wall; 
U2: An accurate estimation of the start time and duration of the cabin wall burn-
through; 
U3:  An accurate estimation of the start time of window burn-through; 
U4: An accurate estimation of the time of the engine fire being controlled by the fire 
fighters, after which the external pool fire plume from the left engine was not 
impinging on the fuselage; 
U5: An accurate estimation of the fire under the fuselage entering the cabin after the 
fire under the left engine was brought under control; 
U6: The burn-through time for the cabin ceiling; 
U7: Human factors such as passenger response times, exits fatalities intended to use, 
etc.   
 
Although the smoke entry via the air-conditioning grills (U1) is not considered to be a major 
contribution to the death toll, it possibly impacts the evacuation behaviour of the passengers, 
i.e. whether they are considered to be walking or crawling.  The parameters U2-U6 relate to 
the damage of the cabin, the injuries to passengers and the number of fatalities.  U7 will 
impact the overall evacuation time and possibly the number of injuries and fatalities.   
 
To reconstruct the incident, estimations for the unknown quantities (U1-U7) have to be 
determined. This is achieved by modifying these parameters and comparing the outcomes of 
the fire and evacuation analysis with the key known outcomes O1-O11, extracted from the 
investigation report(1) as follows: 
O1: The external fire plume covered the cabin wall burn-through location but not Exit 
R2; 
O2: Cabin wall burn-through commenced within one minute; 
O3: Smoke began to enter the galley area after Exit R1 was opened at 70 seconds;  
O4: The locations of the thermally damaged seats;  
O5: 23 of the 51 passengers exiting via Exit R1 and Exit L1 were not exposed to thick 
smoke; 
O6: The usage of exits by the survivors; 
O7: 46% of the survivors who escaped via Exit ROW climbed over seats; 
O8: There were a total of 55 fatalities;  
O9: The seating locations of the fatalities;  
O10: 86% of fatalities died from inhalation of toxic gases while 6% died from thermal 
assault;   
O11: 15 survivors were severely injured by heat/toxic gases; 
 
Outcomes O10 and O11 are not used in the reconstruction process but the evacuation 
outcomes of the finalised reconstruction scenario are compared with them as a way to 
examine the prediction accuracy of the reconstruction. The methodology used to derive 
appropriate values for parameters U1-U7 is presented in the flow chart in Fig. 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. Flow chart for the accident reconstruction. 
 
3.3 Fire simulation set-up  
 
The whole computational domain involves a ground area of 33×30 m2 and a height of 30 m, 
with a total computational mesh of 642,682 cells within the SMARTFIRE simulations. As the 
computational domain outside the cabin is very large, a relatively coarse mesh is used in this 
region especially away from the burn-through area (Fig. 3). The B737-236 aircraft cabin is 
represented using a fine computational mesh, as seen in the monuments and seats, consisting 
of 119,770 computational cells. The mesh density for this B737 cabin is the same as or higher 
than that used in the earlier aircraft fire simulations(13, 31), which has been shown to be 
appropriate to produce converged numerical solutions and reproduce the experimental results 
with a high level of precision.  The burn-through opening of the cabin wall close to seat rows 
17-19 is set to be 2 m long and 0.9 m high, which is modelled by the removal of the cabin 
wall patch by patch from the level of the cabin floor. A ceiling burn-through between seat 
rows 15 and 19 on the top of the fuselage is also represented in the model. Along the two 
cabin sides, two 0.1 m wide floor sheets represent the air conditioning grills for smoke to 
enter before the side cabin wall is burn-through.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Aircraft configuration used in the fire simulations. 
 
The external pool fire has an estimated area of 16 m2 and its shape shown in Fig. 3 as the 
dark area under the left engine is close to the main pool area suggested in the accident 
report(1). The pool fire fuel is represented by kerosene with properties shown in Table 1. The 
properties of the cabin interior materials are identical to those used in the simulation of the 
C133 fire test(13) and in the earlier investigation of the B737 fire(31).  
 
Table 1 
 Properties of kerosene(38) 
 
Density (kg/m3) 750 Specific heat (J/kgK) 2450 
Conductivity (W/mK) 0.17 Boiling point (OC) 216 
Heat of combustion (J/kg) 4.4×107 Heat of evaporation (J/kg) 2.56×105 
 
The exit opening times for the R1, L1, ROW and R2 exits are the same as those in the 
accident, i.e. 70 seconds, 25 seconds, 45 seconds and 0 seconds respectively. As Exit R1 was 
not completely open until 70 seconds, only one third of this door is opened between 10 
seconds and 70 seconds during the fire simulations. The external wind speed is set to be 2.82 
m/s, within the reported range of 2.57-3.60 m/s during the incident(1). The impact of wind 
speed on the fire development and evacuation will be analysed later. 
 
In order to represent the predicted fire hazards within the cabin, a set of 34 hazard zones are 
defined in the cabin in both the fire and evacuation model. As seen in Fig. 4, Zone 1 is 
located adjacent to Exit L1; Zone 14 is located in the aisle near to the over-wing exits; while 
Zone 22 is located adjacent to the burn-through location. Within each zone, fire hazard values 
(i.e. temperature, smoke concentration (extinction coefficient), radiative flux, and 
concentrations of CO, CO2 and O2) predicted in the fire simulations in a layer from 1.5 m to 
2.0 m are averaged and taken to represent the hazards at head height while hazard values 
from 0.3 m to 0.8 m are averaged and taken to represent the hazards at knee height (for 
crawling agents). The averages of predicted temperatures, species concentrations (CO, CO2 
and O2), radiation fluxes and optical density at the head and knee heights in each zone are 
output into a data file. This data file is then imported by airEXODUS to produce the 
atmospheric conditions for evacuation simulations.  The time step size within the fire 
simulation is 1.0 seconds. 
 
 
Figure 4. Fire hazard zones prescribed within both the fire and evacuation models identified 
by dashed lines (several key zones are indicated by their zone number). 
 
3.4 Evacuation simulation set-up  
 
The aircraft geometry and the exit opening times used in this analysis are the same as those 
for the fire simulation. In this study, the fire hazards (as determined by the SMARTFIRE 
CFD fire simulation) that can impact agent behaviour and survivability are, radiative and 
convective heat (through the FIH parameter), the concentrations of the narcotic gases CO, 
CO2 and O2 (through the FIN parameter) and smoke concentration (through the light 
extinction coefficient).  The impact of irritant fire gases is not considered in this analysis as 
they were not determined in the fire simulation. The evacuation parameters used in the 
analysis are the default airEXODUS parameter set except those specified here. 
 
Passengers identified as accident survivors have their personal attributes (i.e. age and gender) 
set using the airEXODUS default certification parameter set as these details were not 
provided in the accident report.   Passengers identified as accident fatalities are set with their 
actual ages and genders as reported in the accident report.  Among the 131 passengers, one 
child and two infants, who evacuated in adults’ arms, are not specially taken into account in 
the reconstruction. Considering the severity of the incident, agents are allowed to undertake 
extreme behaviours within the model such as climbing over passenger seats and crawling, 
behaviours not normally used in certification applications.  Agents have the option to climb 
over seat backs only if their agility attribute is sufficiently large.  Initially, the default agility 
levels for all but the most elderly agents are sufficient to allow them to climb over seats. 
However, the agility of an agent reduces in response to their exposure to the narcotic and 
irritant gases.  The behaviour sub-model within airEXODUS allows agents to climb over a 
seat back if they have sufficient agility and if their normal path is blocked or congested.  
Furthermore, they will only decide to climb over seats once their local patience attribute 
(default values between 2.0 and 10.0 seconds) has expired due to enforced waiting resulting 
from congestion or if their path is blocked.  Passengers are forced to crawl in a prescribed 
hazard zone when the head height light extinction coefficient in this zone reaches 0.5/m. All 
other agent attributes such as walking speeds assume the default airEXODUS values.  
 
In order to generate a similar seating distribution of fatalities and exit usage to those that 
occurred in the real incident, the following model setup is imposed on the simulation: 
 Relatively short response times and low patience values are set for the agents who 
survived and were located in the aft of the cabin. This enables these agents to start to 
move early and climb over seats to get to the exits if the aisle is blocked by other 
passengers. The precise values used for these parameters are determined from the 
iterative reconstruction analysis (U7 parameter). 
 Agents representing other survivors are assigned default response times (between 1.0 
and 6.0 seconds). 
 Agents representing fatalities are assigned long response times (greater than the 
default values).  The precise values used for these parameters are determined from the 
iterative reconstruction analysis (U7 parameter). 
 Each accident survivor will maintain their assigned target exit.  This is the exit that 
was used by the survivor in the actual accident.   Thus the agents are forced to use the 
exits that they used during the actual accident. 
 As it is unknown which exit accident fatalities attempted to use, it is assumed that 
they select their nearest available exit, i.e., the overriding ambition of these 
passengers is to exit via their nearest exit, rather than to travel further.  This 
assumption is based on data derived from analysis of past accidents(39-41).  
 
Concerning the impact of behaviours exhibited by socially connected groups (e.g. family 
groups, close friends, etc) on evacuation performance, such as responding at the same time or 
moving towards the same exit(41), while linked behaviours such as these can be included in 
the airEXODUS simulation, this was not explicitly considered but were implicitly 
represented.  This was achieved using several approaches, first the known exit usage of the 
survivors was imposed on the simulation, thus inevitably, connected social groups who are 
more likely to use the same exits will use those exits.  Furthermore, the iterative process used 
to undertake the reconstruction analysis resulted in tuning some of the parameters such as 
passenger response times – delaying or speeding up the start of individual evacuations as may 
have occurred if socially connected groups were involved.   
 
The evacuation simulations are run until no survivors remain inside the cabin. As the 
airEXODUS simulation is stochastic in nature, if the simulation is repeated without any 
changes to the initial or boundary conditions the results will not be exactly the same.  Thus 
the evacuation results presented in this paper represent the average values derived from 200 
evacuation simulation repetitions.   
 
 
4.0 RESULTS FROM THE ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION 
 
The reconstruction of the fire development and evacuation process for the Manchester aircraft 
fire accident is considered to be completed when appropriate values for the unknown 
parameters (U1-U7) are identified. The parameter set with which the simulation produces a 
reasonable agreement with the known outcomes has the following values. The entry rate of 
smoke via the air conditioning grills (U1) is set to be 0.0012kg/s.  Smoke starts entering the 
cabin through different portions of the ventilation grills, from 20 seconds at the aft cabin to 
60 seconds at the forward cabin end.  Using these times, smoke can move to the front 
monument area when Exit R1 is open as observed in the accident. The burn-through times 
(U2) in the reconstruction, represented by the removal of the side wall, patch by patch, with a 
length of 2 m and a height of 0.1 m for each patch, are: the first patch (at the floor level) is 
removed at 75 seconds, second patch (0.1 m above the floor) is removed at 100 seconds, the 
last patch (0.9 m above the floor) is removed at 155 seconds (See Fig. 5). The window burn-
through time (U3) is at 95 seconds, just 20 seconds after the bottom piece of the burn-through 
area is removed.  
 
  
Figure 5. Wall burn-through process in the reconstruction. 
 
According to the official investigation report(1), the estimated fuel leakage rate from the fuel 
tank was between 0.062 m3/s and 0.0078 m3/s in 40 seconds and remained at this level for a 
few minutes. A fuel rate of 0.0078 m3/s is approximately equivalent to a heat release rate 
(HRR) of 260 MW if the fuel is kerosene. The external HRR from the pool fire in the 
reconstruction are shown in Fig. 6, which quickly increases to 35 MW at 25 seconds and then 
gradually to 40 MW after 80 seconds. Therefore, the burning rate of the pool fire in this 
accident would be approximately one seventh of its potential value based on the fuel leakage 
rate from the fuel tank. The relative low fuel burning rate compared with the potential 
maximum value is the result of fire fighting during the incident.  
 
 
Figure 6. External pool fire HRRs in the reconstruction. 
 
The time for the fire fighters to control the fire under the left engine (U4) is estimated at 95 
seconds. After 95 seconds, the fire entry into the cabin is mainly from the pool burning 
underneath the fuselage. The rate of heat entering the cabin through the burn-through area 
underneath the fuselage (U5) is as high as 3MW at 85 seconds but lasts only around 50 
seconds (Fig. 7). The interior cabin fire starts after 75 seconds but quickly increases to 7 MW 
at 120 seconds due to the entry of the external fire. The time to the burn-through of the 
ceiling (U6) is approximately from 145 seconds to 175 seconds within the reconstruction.   
 
The response times and patience (U7) for those passengers that survived in the aft of the 
cabin are as small as 0 seconds and 1.0 seconds respectively – indicating that they react quite 
quickly and take decisive action when confronted with severe congestion. The response times 
for some fatalities in the accident can be as long as 30 seconds in this reconstruction.  The 
other surviving passengers have default response times (between 1.0 – 6.0 seconds) and 
default patience values (between 2.0 and 10.0 seconds).  
 
 
Figure 7. HRRs of the external fire underneath the fuselage and interior cabin materials in the 
accident reconstruction. 
 
The comparison between the known outcomes from the accident and those from the 
reconstruction simulation are summarised in Table 2. Basically, all the 11 accident outcomes 
are predicted by the reconstruction simulation. The wind was the principal factor controlling 
the fire's behaviour.  It carried the external pool fuel fire against and beneath the rear fuselage. 
Figure 8(a) demonstrates the impact of the wind on the smoke movement from the pool fire(1). 
It is reported that the opened Exit R2 allowed an early entry of smoke and possibly some 
flame, but was not the principal point of entry of the fire into the cabin. As seen in Fig. 8(b), 
the external flow pattern in the reconstruction follows that described in the accident 
investigation report and the fire plume leans against the burn-through area and goes under the 
fuselage; Exit R2 is outside the fire plume but engulfed by heavy smoke (Fig. 8(c)).  
 
Table 2 
 Comparison of the outcomes between the accident and reconstruction 
 
Outcome Accident Reconstruction 
O1 The external fire plume covered the cabin 
wall burn-through area and was beneath 
the fuselage but not Exit R2 
The predicted fire plume in Fig. 8(b) follows the 
observation in the accident. The fire plume also goes 
under the fuselage.   
O2 The start of the wall burn-through 
occurred within one minute 
The first patch of wall is removed at 75 seconds (Fig. 
9).  
O3 Smoke began entering the galley area 
some time after 70 seconds 
At 70 seconds, the smoke is predicted to reach the 
galley area. See Fig. 8(c) for smoke inside the cabin at 
this moment. 
O4 The damage to the seats on the right half 
of the cabin and on the aft cabin was 
more severe than that on the left half and 
the forward half of the cabin (Fig. 10 (a))  
The distribution of the ignited seats in the 
reconstruction is in reasonably good agreement with 
the findings in the accident (Fig. 10(b))  
O5 23 of the 51 passengers who exited via 
the front exits escaped before thick 
smoke had reached them. 
The average number of agents that escape from the 
front exits before the heavy smoke reached them is 
between 18.7 and 37.7 in the reconstruction. 
O6 Number of survivors who exited via Exit 
R1, ROW and L1 are 35, 27 and 18 
respectively 
 On average, 32.1, 27.5 and 17 agents are predicted to 
escape through the three exits respectively 
O7 46% of the 27 survivors that exited via 48% (13.2 agents) of those survivors via Exit ROW 
Exit ROW had to climb over seats are predicted to climb over seats  
O8 There were 55 fatalities There are an average of 55.5 fatalities 
O9 Most of the fatalities were initially 
seating in the aft of the cabin (Fig. 11(a)) 
Comparable fatality locations are seen in the 
reconstruction and the accident (Fig. 11) 
O10 Of the 54 fatalities on board, 48 (89%) 
died from toxic fire gases while 6% died 
solely from thermal assault. 
55.5 fatalities (incapacitation) are predicted,  all of 
which are initially caused by heat exposure. However, 
the final cause of death  for 41 of the agents is highly 
likely to be inhalation of toxic fire gases.   
O11 15 survivors were severely injured due to 
heat or toxic/irritant smoke. 
10.9 agents have FIH, or FIN values greater than 0.1, 
implying severe injuries.  
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
 
 
 (b) 
 
 
(c) 
 
Figure 8. (a) Static fire plumes in the accident(1); (b) external fire plume and wind flow and 
(C) smoke iso-surface (with light extinction coefficient of 0.5/m) from the reconstruction 
simulation. 
 
It is estimated that within 1 minute of the aircraft stopping, the fire penetrated the cabin side 
walls just above floor level adjacent to seats, giving the fire direct access to the cabin 
interior(1). The first patch of the side wall at the burn-through area is removed at 75 seconds, 
approximately 15 seconds later than the estimation from the report (Fig. 9). The burn-through 
process lasts 80 seconds, to a height of 0.9 m above the cabin floor. In the accident, the fire 
was entrained beneath the rear fuselage by the wind, creating a large area of fire-contact with 
the fuselage at a high rate of heat transfer into the cabin. This mode of heat transfer is simply 
represented by an unknown parameter (U5) in the reconstruction.    
 
As seen in Fig. 8(c); the smoke inside the cabin reaches the galley area along two sides of the 
cabin walls at 70 seconds while heavy smoke under the ceiling and overhead bins are seen in 
the aft cabin. This closely matches O3. 
 
 
Figure 9. Start of burn-through at the cabin floor level at 75 seconds in the reconstruction. 
 
The damaged seats found in the aftermath of the accident are shown in Fig. 10(a). In this 
figure, both the burnt seats and the degree of damage are presented. The severely burnt seats 
were mainly located in the rear part of the cabin, in the vicinity of the left aircraft wing and 
on the right side of the forward cabin. The distribution of the ignited seats in the 
reconstruction is in reasonably good agreement with the findings in the accident (Fig. 10(b)).  
Within Fig. 10(b), each dot represents a cell within the computational mesh describing the 
seat that is predicted to have been consumed by the fire i.e. burnt out. 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 10. (a) Seat damage in the accident (top: below squab level; bottom: squab level and 
above); (b) ignited seat locations at 180 seconds in the reconstruction. 
 
 
Among the 51 passengers who exited via the front exits, 23 of them escaped before thick 
smoke had reached them. In the reconstruction, an average of 18.7 agents escaped from the 
front exit before the start of burn-through (less smoke inside the cabin) and 37.7 agents 
without crawling (crawling occurs when the upper layer smoke optical density reaches 0.5/m). 
Thus in the reconstruction, the number of agents that escape from the front exits before the 
heavy smoke has reached them is between 18.7 and 37.7. In the accident, there were 35, 27 
and 18 survivors exiting via Exit R1, ROW and L1 respectively. The numbers of survivors 
using these exits are 32.1, 27.5 and 17.0 respectively within the reconstruction. Furthermore, 
46% of the 27 survivors through Exit ROW were reported to have climbed over seats during 
their evacuation while in the reconstruction, 48% of the predicted survivors who exit via Exit 
ROW climb over seats.  
 
There were 54 fatalities on board the aircraft in the actual accident with one passenger dying 
later in hospital.  Within the reconstruction an average of 55.5 fatalities is predicted. The 
predicted fatality seating locations are comparable with those in the accident (See Fig. 11). Of 
the 54 fatalities on board, 48 (89%) died from toxic fire gases while 6% died solely from 
thermal assault. The actual causes of the deaths were determined by medical examination. All 
of the predicted fatalities are initially incapacitated due to heat exposure, the first cause of an 
agent losing the ability to move. In the incident, approximately 7 minutes after the aircraft 
stopped it became clear that no more passengers were likely to evacuate unaided. In the 
evacuation simulations, within 7 minutes from the start of the fire, 41 of the 55.5 predicted 
fatalities have FIN values of 1.0, indicating the likely final causes of these fatalities are 
inhalation of toxic fire gases. For example, the first fatality lost the ability to move 
(incapacitation) at approximate 90.2 seconds due to heat exposure and the FIN value for this 
person reaches 1.0 at 117 seconds. 
 
A total of 15 survivors were severely injured due to heat or toxic smoke inhalation in the 
actual incident. Within the reconstruction, 10.9 agents have FIH, or FIN value greater than 
0.1 suggesting that they were likely to have incurred severe injuries. 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 11. (a) Usage of the exits by survivors and seat locations of the fatalities in the 
accident(1) and (b) predicted fatality locations (white seats) resulting from a single simulation. 
 
The predicted fire hazards in the cabin vary with time and location. Since the main purpose of 
this study is to demonstrate the reconstruction methodology and examine the impact of time 
to open the exits, the strength of the external wind, the improvement of cabin materials on the 
fire development and evacuating passengers, the fire hazards in the cabin in the 
reconstruction will be not analysed in detail. Figure 12 (a) presents the head height and knee 
height temperatures in the aisle as a function of distance from the front edge of the forward 
exits.  The temperature curves are at 90 seconds (the aviation certification trial requirement), 
at 105 seconds (last passenger to evacuate via the ROW exit) and at 130 seconds (just before 
the completion of evacuation) from when the aircraft stopped.  At 90 seconds (15 seconds 
after the start of cabin wall burn-through), the temperatures in the aisle near the forward cabin 
end are very low (below 30 OC). Passengers in this region escape the cabin simply by 
walking out (Fig. 12(b)). From the forward cabin, the head height temperatures gradually 
increase to 340 OC at the middle cabin (near the over-wing exits at around 9m) and further to 
over 1000OC at the rear of the cabin. Due to the presence of heavy toxic smoke and high 
temperatures in the upper layer, passengers in the aisle in the middle of the cabin are forced 
to crawl. The knee height temperatures in the region closer to the burn-through area are 
around 170 OC. With these high temperatures and radiation fluxes (34 kW/m2), some of the 
agents in this region are incapacitated at around 90 seconds (Fig. 12 (b)). At 105 seconds, the 
head height temperatures in the aisle are above 330 OC except at the front end. At this time, 
there are no survivors remaining in the aft cabin. The head height temperatures further 
increase to above 530 OC at 130 seconds. The knee height temperatures in the forward cabin 
aisle are already around 60-100 OC. In the reconstruction, all passengers remaining in the 
cabin after 131.7 seconds are incapacitated.  
 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 12. (a)  Predicted head height and knee height temperatures in the aisle; (b) evacuating 
passengers at 90 seconds in one single evacuation simulation (from light to dark colour, the 
temperature changes from 20 OC to 150 OC above). 
 
The sensitivity of the predicted simulation outcomes to the various unknown parameters is 
summarised here. Firstly, among the 11 outcomes (O1-O11) extracted from the fire 
investigation report, the number of fatalities (O8) and the thermally damaged seats (O4) are 
most important in deriving the time for the pool fire being brought under control, the wall 
burn-through period and the amount of heat entering the cabin from the impinging fire 
underneath the fuselage. Secondly, the determination of U4 is critical to the correct 
reconstruction of the incident. The fire simulation results indicate that the flow pattern within 
the cabin caused by fresh air entering the cabin via the burn-through area is probably the root 
cause of the observed distribution of the burnt seats (see Fig. 10 (a)), in particular there were 
fewer thermally damaged seats on the left side in the forward cabin compared to the right side. 
If the external fire covers the whole burn-through area during the entire simulation period, the 
numerical predictions suggests that the fire front moves forward quite evenly across the cabin 
from one side to the other. As a result, the ignited seats on both sides of the aisle propagate 
forward evenly, which clearly contradicts the distribution of the damaged seats as shown in 
Fig. 10(a). This implies that the airflow pattern inside the cabin within the simulation is 
incorrect. The fire simulation results show that only with the entry of fresh air from the burn-
through area, could the cabin flow pattern produce the observed damaged seat distribution. 
This flow pattern was created after the fire under the left engine was brought under control by 
the fire fighters (U4), which allowed fresh air to enter the cabin via the burn-through area. 
Thirdly, the determination of U5 is essential to correctly predict the number of fatalities. As 
suggested in the investigation report, the fire entering the cabin was mainly from the fire 
under the fuselage after the fire under the left engine was brought under control. Simulation 
results show that without the inclusion of this factor of fire development, the number of 
fatalities (O8) would be greatly under-predicted. Fourthly, the setting of the passenger 
patience and response time parameters are responsible for producing the reasonable 
agreement between the predicted and observed fatality seating locations.    
 
The results from the reconstruction and sensitivity analysis has demonstrated that with 
appropriate values for the unknown fire and evacuation model parameters, the coupled fire 
and evacuation analysis is capable of reproducing the complex fire dynamics and resulting 
evacuation dynamics involved in the Manchester B737 post-crash  fire involving an external 
pool fire with wind, burn-through of the fuselage, and spread of the fire in the cabin and the 
impact of fire hazards on evacuating passengers.  
 
5.0 IMPACT OF EXIT OPENING TIMES AND EXTERNAL WIND 
 
5.1 Exit opening times  
 
In this section, the impact of the delay in opening exits on the cabin ventilation and hence the 
spread of heat, smoke and toxic products throughout the cabin and the subsequent fatalities 
are investigated. The accident reconstruction identified a set of parameters (U1-U7) with 
which the fire and evacuation simulations provided a reasonable agreement with the main 
accident outcomes. Using the values for these parameters, the impact of the exit opening 
times on the evacuation is now examined.   
 
Four scenarios varying only in the exit opening times are compared with the reconstruction 
scenario. The exit opening times in the accident all have significant delays compared with the 
requirement of aviation certification trials. The scenario investigated in the accident 
reconstruction has Exit R1 opening 70 seconds after the aircraft has completely stopped due 
to an exit malfunction. This time is much longer than the normal exit opening time of 8.2 
seconds derived from industry standard certification trials(37). The impact of this delay on the 
evacuation and subsequent number of fatalities is examined. Therefore, Scenario 1 has the 
same setup as the reconstruction but Exit R1 is opened at 8.2 seconds. The over-wing Type-
III exit ROW was opened by passengers at approximately 45 seconds in the accident. The 
standard opening time for this type of exit is 12 seconds. Scenario 2 is the same as the 
reconstruction scenario but with an opening time of 12 seconds for Exit ROW. Scenario 3 
assumes that all the three exits used for evacuation, i.e., Exit L1, Exit R1 and Exit ROW, are 
opened at 8.2 seconds, 8.2 seconds and 12 seconds respectively. The fourth scenario 
considers what would have happened if the unused Exit R2 was not opened during the 
incident.  
 
Due to the changes of opening times of some exits, passengers’ behaviour in exit selection 
during evacuation may be different from that in the reconstruction. As exits become available 
sooner passengers have a greater choice of available exits and so may elect to use a different 
exit to the one that is assigned to them based on the exit that was used in the actual accident. 
Therefore, the following two assumptions are postulated to guide agent exit selection for the 
exit opening time analysis:  
Assumption 1: Agents are assigned target exits as in the reconstruction.  However, they are 
allowed to change their assigned target exits to the nearest available exit, excluding Exit L1, 
if they become impatient while waiting in the exit queue to their original target exit. This 
assumption only applies to agents representing the passengers that survived in the actual 
accident. 
Assumption 2:  All other agents attempt to utilise their nearest exit, excluding Exit L1, and 
are allowed to change their preferred exit if they become impatient while waiting in the exit 
queue, again excluding Exit L1.  
 
Thus with these assumptions, no additional agents will utilise Exit L1, all additional 
surviving agents will elect to use either Exit R1 or Exit ROW.   
 
Among the exits, Exit ROW is the nearest to the burn-through location available for 
evacuation. It is interesting to compare the fire hazards at locations near this exit between the 
various scenarios. Figure 13 compares the predicted knee height temperatures in the aisle 
near the over wing exits. From Fig. 13, the earlier exit opening times contribute negligible 
temperature difference in this region as the burn-through occurs later than the times to open 
the exits. Therefore, the exit opening times do not significantly impact the cabin fire 
development or the survivability within the cabin.  
 
 
Figure 13. Predicted temperatures at knee height in the aisle near the over-wing exits with 
different exit opening times. 
 
However, exit opening times are critical for a successful evacuation. Evacuation simulation 
results from the four scenarios are presented in Table 3. In Scenario 1, even without the 
malfunction of Exit R1, loss of life could not be completely avoided. However, the fatalities 
could be significantly reduced from 55.5 in the reconstruction to just 7.0, a reduction of 87%. 
Furthermore, in this scenario, there is still an average of 6.8 severe injuries. This indicates 
how essential it is that cabin crew are able to open all the exits as quickly as possible.  As 
demonstrated in this simulation, a delay of about a minute in opening an exit can result in a 
large loss of life if fire has gained access to the cabin.  This result also demonstrates why it is 
essential to have a cabin crew member available at each floor level exit that is able to open 
the exit within seconds. If there is only a single crew member responsible for opening both 
exits in an exit pair, or should a crew member be injured as a result of the accident and unable 
to open their exit, this can delay the opening of both exits potentially contributing to loss of 
life.   
 
Without the delay in opening Exit ROW in Scenario 2, the fatalities could be reduced from 
55.5 in the reconstruction to 35.6 a reduction of 36%.  This result suggests that it is essential 
that passengers seated beside over-wing Type III exits are capable of operating the exit in the 
event of an emergency. As demonstrated in this simulation, a delay of just 30 seconds in 
opening the over-wing exit resulted in some 20 fatalities.  It is thus essential that passengers 
seated beside manually operated over-wing exits are able to quickly open these exits.  In 
Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 the evacuation times are all around 130 seconds as in the 
reconstruction scenario.  The earlier opening of the exits does not significantly change the 
total evacuation time as one may expect due to the additional passengers that survive and 
hence need to exit the aircraft. Scenario 3 has all the three available exits open within the 
certification trial times. In this scenario, all the passengers can safely evacuate the cabin 
without incurring any fatalities or serious injury. The evacuation is completed within 84.4 
seconds, close to the time at which the first fatality occurs within the reconstruction (81.8 
seconds), Scenario 1 (87.0 seconds) and Scenario 2 (85.1 seconds) respectively.  
 
Table 3  
Evacuation results for the accident reconstruction and earlier exit opening simulations 
 
 
Scenario 
Survivors Fatalities 
On Ground 
Time (s)  
Exit L1 
usage 
Exit R1 
usage 
Exit ROW 
usage  
FIH>0.1 Number First 
death 
time (s) 
Reconstruction 131.7 17.0 32.1 27.5 10.9 55.5 81.8 
1 (R1: 8.2s) 129.7 18.3 86.0 20.7 6.8 7.0 87.0 
2 (ROW: 12s) 133.6 17.2 34.1 45.1 11.6 35.6 85.1 
3 (L1, R1: 8.2s; 
ROW: 12s) 
84.4 24.2 75.4 32.4 0 0 -- 
4 (R2 closed) 109.3 18.9 40.1 27.3 14.3 46.5 79.6 
 
With additional assumptions 1 and 2, it is postulated that the earlier opening of exits does not 
change passengers’ reluctance to evacuate via Exit L1. These assumptions are supported by 
the actual usages of the exits by passengers in the accident. In the accident, although Exit L1 
opened 45 seconds sooner than Exit R1, only 18 passengers evacuate via this exit, just half of 
those that use Exit R1.  This is due to the fact that Exit L1 was on the side of the external 
pool fire and thus passengers had a reluctance to use this exit. The influence of this 
assumption on the evacuation outcomes are examined through two additional scenarios,  
Scenario 1a and Scenario 3a, in which Assumptions 1 and 2 are relaxed  allowing all agents 
to include exit L1 in their exit selection.  Furthermore, the exit opening times in these 
additional scenarios are the same as those in Scenario 1 and Scenario 3. The purpose of these 
simulations is to demonstrate how the evacuation may have been improved if more 
passengers were prepared to utilise Exit L1. The evacuation results with and without the 
modified assumptions are compared in Table 4.  
 
In Scenario 1a with the modified assumptions, the number of passengers escaping via Exit L1 
is greatly increased, being 2.5 times that in Scenario 1 where Assumptions 1 and 2 are strictly 
enforced. Thus in this scenario better use is made of both the large front exits.  The improved 
use of both exits at the front of the aircraft should result in a substantial reduction in the 
evacuation time and in the number of fatalities.  However, the evacuation time is reduced by 
only 12%, from 129.7 seconds to 113.5 seconds, and the number of fatalities is reduced from 
an average of 7.0 to 5.0.  A similar behaviour is noted in Scenario 3a, where the overall 
evacuation time has only improved by just 3.6 seconds (4.3%) even though the number of 
agents using L1 has doubled.  The relatively modest improvement in the evacuation time and 
the number of fatalities is the result of the cabin configuration in the vicinity of Exit L1 and 
R1. The 0.56 m wide aisle aperture between the twin forward bulkheads forces the evacuating 
passengers to form a single file flow. The resulting flow produced by the single aisle is 
insufficient to enable both the L1 and R1 exit to operate at their full evacuation flow 
capability. Thus while the two exits are available and being used by a large number of agents, 
they do not produce a marked reduction in evacuation time or the number of fatalities. This 
result supports earlier observations that two Type I exits within an exit pair being feed by a 
single narrow aisle does not produce twice the exit flow of a single Type I exit(39). 
 
Table 4 
 Evacuation comparison between passengers exit selection with and without modified 
exit selection assumptions  
 
 
Scenario 
Survivors  
Fatalities 
 
On Ground 
Time (s)  
Exit L1  
average usage 
Exit R1 
average usage 
Exit ROW  
average usage 
1 (R1: 8.2s) 129.7 18.3 86.0 20.7 7.0 
1a (R1: 8.2s) 113.5 46.0 60.7 20.5 5.0 
3 (L1, R1: 8.2s; 
ROW: 12s) 
84.4 24.2 75.4 32.1 0 
3a (L1, R1: 8.2s; 
ROW: 12s) 
80.8 44.9 54.5 32.5 0 
 
The exit opening time analysis has demonstrated that delays of seconds in opening exits can 
result in large loss of life.  Had all the viable exits been opened within the time achieved in 
evacuation certification trials, it is suggested that that all the fatalities in the Manchester B737 
accident could have been completely avoided. Therefore, in aircraft accidents involving fire, 
it is essential that all the viable exits are opened as quickly as possible.  
 
5.2 Impact of Exit R2 Opening 
 
Exit R2 was opened before the aircraft completely stopped. While the Exit R2 was not the 
main point for entry of the fire smoke into the cabin, it was not used by passengers during the 
evacuation, probably because of the proximity of the external fire. The official investigation 
report of the accident indicated that the opening of the exit may have contributed to the high 
loss of life in the accident. This indication is examined in Scenario 4 in which Exit 2 is closed 
with all other setup parameters being the same as the reconstruction.  The results of Scenario 
4 are presented in Fig. 13 and Table 3. As seen in Fig. 13, with the closure of Exit R2, the 
predicted temperatures in the aisle near Exit ROW are lower than those in the reconstruction 
by approximate 15-50% after 100 seconds. The evacuation results in Table 3 show that had 
Exit R2 been closed throughout the fire (Scenario 4) there would have been 9 (16%) fewer 
fatalities than in the reconstruction scenario. Therefore, the opening of exit R2 in the accident 
seems likely to have been a contributing factor to the high loss of life in this accident, but not 
as significant as the failure to open the other exits on time. This result can be explained 
through the different flow patterns in the two exit opening scenarios. With Exit R2 open there 
is a flow path between the burn-through area and Exit R2. As a result, more combustible fuel 
at the bottom of the burn-through area is blown into the cabin than in the case with Exit R2 
closed. This can be seen from the air flow patterns at the burn-through area in Fig. 14 for the 
two different exit opening scenarios.   
 
 
(a)  
 
(b) 
Figure 14. Air flows at the cross plane passing through the burn-through area at 100 seconds 
in (a) the reconstruction and (b) the simulation with Exit R2 closed. 
 
It is surprising that this result contradicts that in the earlier work(31), which suggested that 
17% more deaths could be expected if Exit R2 was closed. This contradiction arises from the 
different representation of the external pool fire in the two simulations. The external fire in(31) 
is simply modelled as a pan fire next to the burn-through area, an approach developed in the 
experimental studies of post-crash cabin fire by FAA(4). This approach of representing the 
external fire is appropriate for a scenario in which the fuselage collapses to the ground and 
the external fuel fire is adjacent to the fuselage. Clearly it is not an accurate representation of 
the external fire in the Manchester accident in which the aircraft stood on its landing gear. 
Using the simplified approach adopted in the earlier simulation, as the fuel pan is 
immediately adjacent to the burn-through area, virtually the entire fire plume is blown into 
the cabin even in the case with Exit R2 closed (see Fig. 15). Therefore, in the earlier work, 
the opening of Exit R2 had only a minor impact on the amount of external fire entering the 
cabin i.e. it was virtually the same whether the Exit R2 was open or not. However, opening of 
the Exit R2 increased the ventilation of the cabin resulting in a more survivable evacuation 
environment and hence caused fewer fatalities. In contrast, in the more realistic simulation 
presented in this paper, the external fire is represented using a pool fire model and the fire 
origin is under the left engine as in the accident (See Fig. 3 for the pool fire location). With 
this approach, the fire plume will either enter the cabin through the burn-through area, or rise 
above or go under the fuselage. As shown in Fig. 14, the opening of Exit R2 not only alters 
the ventilation inside the cabin, but also changes the amount of the external fire entering the 
cabin. Thus the current pool fire model compared with the fuel pan is a more realistic 
representation of the external fire in the Manchester airport B773 fire accident. 
 
It is thus likely that opening of the R2 exit during the accident was a contributing factor to the 
high loss of life in this accident.  However, had the fuselage been on its belly due to the 
failure of the landing gear and the external fuel fire been adjacent to the fuselage, it is likely 
that opening the rear door would have counterintuitively improved conditions within the 
cabin. This suggests that in a post-crash fire with wind, the fuselage position, standing on its 
landing gear or collapsing onto the ground, will have a significant impact on the fire 
development and resulting evacuation and survivability. 
 
 
Figure 15. Air flow at the cross plane passing through the burn-through area at 100 seconds in 
the earlier work with Exit R2 closed. 
 
5.3 External wind  
 
Here, a critical wind speed is determined for the given pool fire location, beyond which the 
external pool fire will be blown onto the fuselage. Then, the impact of wind speed on the fire 
development and evacuation is analysed. It is known that the wind speed during the accident 
was around 2.57-3.60 m/s, which is an important factor for the burn-through of the fuselage 
as the pool fire was blown onto the fuselage. Within the original reconstruction analysis 
reported earlier in this paper, the wind speed used in the analysis was 2.82 m/s.  However, it 
is important to determine at what wind speed a burn-through can be avoided. A series of fire 
simulations are carried out with the fuel pool area the same as that in the reconstruction but 
with varied external wind speeds.  As expected, a mild wind will make the external fire 
localised around the left engine while a strong wind will blow the fire plume onto the 
fuselage. With the same wind direction as in the accident but a wind speed value of 1.5 m/s, 
the pool fire plume rises up almost vertically creating a gap of approximately 1 m between it 
and the fuselage (Fig. 16(a)). However, a wind speed of 2.0 m/s is sufficient to cause the pool 
fire plume to lean against the fuselage (Fig. 16(b)).  
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
Figure 16. External pool fire plume at 70 seconds under a wind speed of (a) 1.5 m/s and (b) 
2.0 m/s. 
 
With a reduced wind speed it is likely that the burn-through will occur at a later time and be 
of a reduced burn-through area. A conservative estimation of the impact of reduced wind 
speeds on both the cabin fire development and evacuation can be examined using the same 
burn-through time and area as those determined for the accident reconstruction. The impact 
of external wind speed on cabin fire development is investigated by comparing the predicted 
temperatures at the knee height in the aisle near the over-wing exits under different external 
wind conditions. The predictions of the temperatures are presented in Fig. 17. As seen in Fig. 
17, when the external wind speed is 1.5 m/s, the cabin temperature at the location of interest 
is not affected by the external fire, with its initial values of 15OC being maintained during the 
200 second fire duration. When the external wind speed increases to 2.0 m/s, the cabin 
temperature has a rise of approximately 10 OC after the start of burn-through. A rapid rise of 
temperature is seen at 130 seconds, which is 50 seconds later than that in the reconstruction 
simulation (which utilised an external wind speed of 2.82 m/s). The evacuation results under 
various wind conditions are presented in Table 5, where it is assumed that the exits open at 
the same time as in the actual accident for each of the simulations, the only difference being 
the wind speed. With an external wind of 1.5 m/s, all the agents on board can safely evacuate 
the cabin and reach the ground within 129.4 seconds. For a wind of 2.0 m/s, there will be an 
average of 32.0 fatalities and 12.5 severe injuries.  The total evacuation time in this case is 
155 seconds, with the temperatures at the over-wing exit increasing rapidly at around 130 
seconds.  Thus the high number of fatalities in this case is due to a number of passengers still 
remaining within the cabin when the temperature begins to rise rapidly.  
 
Considering that the wind affects the burn-through process, it is difficult to achieve a high 
precision in wind sensitivity analysis without an accurate predictive modelling approach to 
the burn-through process. Therefore, the same burn-through time and area as those in the 
reconstruction simulation are used to investigate the impact of wind speed on the cabin fire 
development and the predicted evacuation consequences. The wind speed during the accident 
was around 2.57-3.60 m/s. Using the lower bound wind speed from the actual accident (2.57 
m/s), the cabin temperatures at the location of interest are very close to those generated using 
the wind speed  in the original reconstruction simulation i.e. 2.82 m/s (Fig. 17). As a result, 
the predicted fatalities are very similar to those in the reconstruction simulation, with only 2.7 
fewer fatalities and 4.4 more severe injuries (Table 5).  This is a further evidence to support 
the appropriateness of the use of a wind speed at 2.82 m/s within the reconstruction 
simulation. 
 
 
Figure 17. Predicted temperature at knee height in the aisle near the over-wing exits with 
various external wind speeds. 
 
Table 5 
 Impact of external wind speed on evacuation in accident reconstruction scenario 
 
Wind speed (m/s) On Ground time (s) Fatalities Injuries (FED>0.1) 
2.82*  131.7 55.5 10.9 
1.5  129.4 0 0 
2.0  154.9 32.0 12.5 
2.57  141.1 52.8 15.3 
*   Wind speed used in the original reconstruction case. 
 
Therefore, for the given fuel pool location, size and prevailing wind direction experienced in 
the Manchester B737 fire, the critical wind speed required to engulf the rear of the fuselage is 
just 1.5 m/s. Beyond this critical value, the pool fire plume will impinge on the fuselage and 
the cabin wall is at a high risk of burn-through before passengers safely evacuate from the 
cabin. 
 
6. POTENTIAL ENHANCEMENTS TO AIRCRAFT FIRE SAFETY THROUGH THE 
USE OF ADVANCED AIRCRAFT MATERIALS 
 
Thirty years have passed since the Manchester aircraft fire. Advances in materials technology 
has led to the development of a new generation of materials with improved fire resistance 
used in the current generation of commercial aircraft. How have these new materials 
benefited fire safety of modern aircraft design?  Here, the impact of modern aircraft 
insulation materials with improved burn-though resistance and cabin interior materials with 
higher ignition temperatures are examined. In particular, we explore the impact the current 
generation of aircraft materials would have had on a Manchester type aircraft fire.  
 
6.1 Insulation material  
 
The cabin wall burn-through is the key factor for the fire development within the cabin and 
the resulting fatalities in the Manchester aircraft fire accident. As the time to burn-through is 
essential in the assessment of aircraft fire safety in a post-crash fire scenario, full-scale tests 
to evaluate the fuselage burn-through resistance exposed to large post-crash fuel fires have 
been carried out by the FAA(42). It has been found that an aluminium skin can provide 30-60 
seconds of protection prior to melting and allowing flames to impinge on the insulation 
materials. For the old generation of aircraft insulation materials, the burn-through resistance 
is around 52-96 seconds. Therefore, the burn-though time for a fuselage with these insulation 
materials are between 82 seconds and 156 seconds. The derived start of the wall burn-through 
of 75 seconds for the Manchester aircraft fire in this study is close to the minimum burn-
through times found in the experimental study. For the new generation of cabin insulation 
materials, the burn-through resistance has been significantly improved with burn-through 
times in the range of 4 to 8 minutes. How will the new materials increase passengers’ 
survivability in post-crash fires involving burn-through? A statistical modelling study shows 
that the number of reduced fatalities is an exponential function of the additional burn-through 
protection time(43). Most of the fatalities in accidents could be avoided if the burn-through 
time was increased by 2 minutes. Almost all of the fatalities could be avoided if the 
additional burn-through time could be increased by 4-8 minutes. For a specific accident, the 
number of lives saved with the increase of burn-through time also depends on the available 
exits for evacuation and the delays in opening exit etc.   
 
Given the three available exits and the exit opening times in the Manchester aircraft accident, 
the improvement of survivability with improved fire resistance cabin insulation materials is 
analysed here. In this analysis, it is simply assumed that the new materials only affect the 
time to burn-through while the size of the burn-though area and the time duration of the burn-
through remain the same as those in the reconstruction. With this assumption, the fire hazards 
predicted from the reconstruction of the Manchester accident can be applied in examining the 
impact of burn-through time. This is done by simply delaying the occurrence of the fire 
hazards predicted from the reconstruction by the delayed time to burn-through.  
 
Presented in Fig. 18 is a comparison of the predicted number of fatalities and injuries as a 
function of burn-through time for a Manchester style fire scenario.  If the burn-through time 
is increased by 10 seconds compared with a burn-through of 75 seconds in the reconstruction, 
the number of predicted fatalities is reduced from 55.5 to 37.0 – a reduction of 33%. A 40 
second increase in burn-through time could reduce the number of fire victims to be just one 
person. If the time to burn-though was increased by 50 seconds, resulting in a burn-through 
time of 125 seconds, all of the passengers could escape from the cabin without any fatalities 
or severe injuries. 
 
It is interesting to note that all passengers can evacuate to the ground within 132 seconds if 
there are no fire hazards within the cabin, assuming evacuation conditions equivalent to the 
reconstruction case. This result demonstrates that the use of advanced aircraft materials with 
burn-through times of 4-8 minutes(42)  – an improvement of at least 2 minutes compared to 
the materials from the 1985 era B737 -  could avoid all loose of life resulting from post crash 
pool fires similar to that in the Manchester accident.  
 
The sensitivity analysis of burn-through time demonstrates that all the passengers in the 
Manchester accident could have safely evacuated if the burn-through time could have been 
delayed by just 50 seconds. This result suggests that modern cabin insulation materials that 
have a burn-through time of 4-8 minutes can significantly improve passengers’ survivability 
in post-crash pool fires without a rupture to the fuselage.  
 
 
Figure 18. Impact of burn-through time (s) on fatalities and injuries.  
 
 
6.2 Interior materials 
 
In this section the impact of improved fire resistance of cabin interior materials such as seats, 
overhead bins and floor monuments etc. on survivability is analysed. In the accident 
reconstruction, the properties of the cabin materials are the same as those in the simulation of 
the C133 cabin fire test(13). As mentioned in the official investigation report(1), the regulatory 
standard for cabin material certification was adopted in May 1972 and specified that all large 
usage material must be self-extinguishing in a vertical orientation when subjected to a 
'Bunsen-burner' flame. Whilst such a test may be useful for demonstrating protection against 
a small flame in a cabin, it clearly does not indicate the results of exposure to a large external 
fire. Also as reviewed in this report, full-scale fire tests involving an external pool fire carried 
out at the FAA Technical Centre showed that the use of highly resistant fire-blocking 
covering for seats cushion could increase the time to incapacitation by about 60 seconds 
compared with that without such a fire-blocking layer.  
 
In this simulation the improved cabin materials are represented by increasing the ignition 
temperature of the cabin materials.  Within the reconstruction scenario, the ignition 
temperature of cabin interior materials was set to 505 OC(44). The ignition temperatures of 
modern aircraft cabin materials can be as high as 570 OC(45). Therefore, in the new fire 
simulation all the parameters are identical to those of the reconstruction scenario but all 
interior cabin materials have an ignition temperature of 570 OC (a nearly 13% increase). 
 
The ignited seat locations at 180 seconds in this simulation are presented in Fig. 19. The 
propagation of the fire within the cabin is represented by the damaged seats in this figure. 
Comparing Fig. 10(b) with Fig. 19, it can be seen that a cabin interior material with higher 
ignition temperature will prevent rapid spread of the fire front from the aft of the cabin to the 
forward part of the cabin.  
 
 
Figure 19. Ignited seat locations at 180 seconds in the simulation with ignition temperature of 
570 OC for cabin interior materials. 
 
Now the impact of the advanced cabin interior materials on passengers’ survivability is 
analysed. With the improved internal materials, the average number of incapacitations is 54.7 
compared with 55.5 in the reconstruction.  The insignificant improvement in survivability is 
due to the nature of the fire incident. In the Manchester accident, it is the rapid fuselage burn-
through assisted by the external wind, allowing the fire effluent from the external pool fire 
plume to gain entry into the cabin that is the main contributor to the fire hazards within the 
cabin affecting evacuation.  While the burning of the seats in the rear of the cabin in the 
vicinity of the burn-through also contributes to the non-tenability within the cabin, this is the 
same in both cases due to the extremity of the thermal conditions in this region.  Most of the 
seats in the front of the cabin are ignited after the passengers have evacuated and so does not 
impact survivability.  As a result, the predicted fire hazards within the cabin are almost 
identical during the evacuation process for the two scenarios, with and without the improved 
cabin materials.   
 
While the use of advanced cabin interior materials with a 13% increase in ignition 
temperature has significantly slowed the spread of the internal combustion region (number of 
seats involved in the combustion), this is not expected to have a significant impact on 
passenger survivability as in this accident survivability was driven by the nature of the 
external fire and wind.  
 
7.0 CONCLUSIONS 
 
SMARTFIRE and airEXODUS simulation tools have been used to numerically investigate 
the 1985 Manchester Airport B737 fire/evacuation. The purpose of this analysis was to 
understand the impact of exit opening times, external wind and aircraft cabin materials on 
evacuation and survivability during this accident. The first part of the analysis involved 
reconstructing the cabin fire as closely as possible, adjusting the main unknown parameters 
such as; burn-through time so that the prediction of key measurable outcomes such as damage 
to seats, propagation of cabin smoke, the number and seating distribution of fatalities, the 
percentage of passengers climbing over seats etc were in reasonable agreement with the 
officially reported results. The second part of the analysis investigated the impact of 
influential parameters such as external wind speeds and exit opening times on passenger 
survivability within the Manchester incident.  The third part analysed the benefits that 
modern cabin internal materials and fuselage thermal insulation materials would have in 
slowing down fire development within the cabin and reducing fatalities. 
 
The key findings from this work are: 
 Coupled fire and evacuation analysis is capable of reconstructing the complex fire 
dynamics and resulting evacuation dynamics involved in post crash aircraft fires 
involving an external pool fire with wind, burn-through of the fuselage, and spread of 
the fire in the cabin and the impact of fire hazards on evacuating passengers.    
 In the Manchester Airport B737 fire, a one minute delay in opening the forward exits 
contributed to the loss of 48 lives while a 30 second delay in opening the over-wing 
exit contributed to the loss of 20 lives.  Had all the viable exits been opened within the 
time achieved in evacuation certification trials, it is suggested that all the passengers 
and crew could have safely evacuated. 
o In aircraft accidents involving fire, it is essential that all the viable exits are 
opened as quickly as possible.  Delays of seconds in opening exits can result 
in large loss of life. These results demonstrate why it is essential: 
 to have a cabin crew member available at each floor level exit that is 
able to open the exit within seconds. If there is only a single crew 
member responsible for opening both exits in an exit pair, or should a 
crew member be injured as a result of the accident and unable to open 
their exit, this can delay the opening of both exits potentially 
contributing to loss of life.   
 that passengers seated beside over-wing Type III exits are able to 
quickly operate the exit in the event of an emergency.  
 Within the Manchester accident, the opening of the unused rear exit is likely to have 
contributed to the loss of life. Had the exit not been opened it is likely that there 
would have been 9 (16%) fewer fatalities. Thus while the opening of the exit 
contributed to the high loss of life in this accident, it was not as significant as the 
failure to open the other exits on time. 
o This result contradicts the conclusions of an earlier analysis, in which the 
external fire was simply represented by a pan fuel fire. In this earlier analysis 
the fire simulation was equivalent to a situation in which the fuselage 
collapses to the ground and the external fire is adjacent to the fuselage. This 
suggests that in a post-crash fire with wind, the fuselage position - standing on 
its landing gear or collapsing to the ground - will have a significant impact on 
the interior fire development and hence, evacuation and survivability. 
 The presence of wind is a significant factor in determining the burn-through of the 
fuselage and hence passenger evacuation and survivability.  With the given fuel pool 
position and wind direction as in the Manchester incident, the critical wind speed is 
only 1.5 m/s, beyond which the pool fire plume will impinge on the fuselage and the 
cabin wall is at a high risk of burn-through before passengers safely evacuate from the 
cabin.  
 Numerical simulation results have demonstrated that modern advanced cabin 
insulation materials and cabin interior materials with improved fire resistance can 
significantly improve aircraft fire safety in a post-crash fire scenario. 
o If the burn-through time could have been delayed by just 50 seconds it is 
likely that all the passengers in the Manchester aircraft accident could have 
safely evacuated.  This suggests that significant improvements in passenger 
survivability can be expected from modern cabin insulation materials that have 
burn-through time of 4-8 minutes.  
o While the use of cabin interior materials with a 13% increase in ignition 
temperature could significantly slow down the propagation of the internal 
cabin fire in the Manchester aircraft fire accident, this is not expected to have 
a significant impact on passenger survivability as in this accident survivability 
was driven by the nature of the external fire.  
 
This analysis has shown that in aircraft fire situations, seconds can make the difference 
between life and death.  It is thus essential that cabin crew undertake their evacuation duties 
as quickly as possible and passengers seated beside over wing Type III exits fully appreciate 
the importance of understanding how to open the exit in the event of an emergency. The 
aircraft orientation in a fire is critically important even under a mild wind.  Aircrew should be 
advised to position the aircraft most beneficially against the wind in the event of a ground fire. 
Cabin wall insulations with burn-through resistance of more than 4 minutes and advanced 
cabin interior materials with high ignition temperatures are suggested for commercial 
aircrafts. 
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